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Abstract1 
Hyper forms of globalization have contributed to the diffusion and de-institutionalization of state power 
(Chin and Mittelman, 1997) and to growing populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism in Europe that 
have questioned the liberal international order’s effectiveness, legitimacy and authority. What has come 
under threat is not only the order itself, but the economic prosperity, security, peace, and normative 
foundations that has nurtured it. In this context of a emerging world order we examine what function 
so-called middle powers on both sides of the Atlantic could play?  
While often overseen in recent years, middle powers are important units of analysis to study because 
during the times of the ‘old’ order in the aftermath of WWII they had benefitted most of the stable liberal 
international order, and as a result they have the most to lose today in case that order changes 
dramatically or even disappears. In looking back at middle power’s presence at creation of the liberal 
international world order in the aftermath of WWII, we suggest, helps us to comprehend what function 
middle powers could play in this current wave of changing transatlantic orders. Especially their intra-
alliance bridgebuilding function is important in this regard that in the past helped to balance the 
interests of the major powers. Canada is discussed as a case study.  
Key words: Middle Powers; globalization; liberal internationalism; new world order; transatlantic 
relationship 
The literature on changing global orders is long and extensive. During the Cold War 
analysts spoke of a bipolar world order that switched into a unipolar order at the Cold 
War’s end. In both cases, however, at least in the West, the order was carried by liberal 
international values and institutions that embody these values. Obvious examples of 
such are, of course, the Bretton Woods institutions, the United Nations (UN) or the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the end of WWII. 
However, since 9/11 analysts started to detect a challenge to the liberal international 
order’s effectiveness, legitimacy and authority (Flockhart, 2016, p. 14), especially at 
times when hyper forms of globalization have contributed to the diffusion and de-
institutionalization of state power (Chin and Mittelman, 1997, pp. 28-34) and to growing 
                                                        
1 I gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
(SSHRC) for this project as well as Antoine Rayroux and John Kotsopoulos for their very useful comments and 
suggestions. 
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populism, nationalism and authoritarianism (Lind and Wohlforth, 2019).2 What has 
come under threat is not only the order itself, but the economic prosperity, security, 
peace and normative foundations that has nurtured it (Zakaria, 2019). This is perhaps 
most visible with President Trump openly questioning the ‘old’ world order, threatening 
to disregard international law, disrespect international institutions and reverting to an 
isolationist US foreign policy. This policy has significantly undermined the transatlantic 
alliance and its commitment to multilateralism. 
Our objective here is not to further contribute to this rather extensive literature on 
changing world orders. Rather, in taking the understanding among scholars as a starting 
point that the current order indeed is changing and becoming more diverse, our 
objective is to examine what function middle powers (e.g. Canada, Norway or Denmark) 
on both sides of the Atlantic can play in this emerging new world order and at times of 
significant insecurity in Europe’s security institutions (especially the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO).  
Why are middle powers important units of analysis to consider? While often overseen in 
recent years, they are important units of analysis to study because during the times of 
the ‘old’ order in the aftermath of WWII they had benefitted most of that stable liberal 
international order: they had grown safer, were protected by their major power allies 
(e.g. the US, the UK), and as a result have become enormously prosperous under the 
rules-based liberal international world order that emerged after WWII. So, in case this 
liberal international world order would continue to be shaken during the emerging new 
Trump/Brexit order – or even if this order breaks down entirely – middle powers have a 
lot to lose, perhaps most of all partners and allies.3 
In short, in looking back at middle power’s presence at creation of the liberal 
international world order in the aftermath of WWII, we suggest, helps us to comprehend 
what function middle powers could play in this current wave of changing transatlantic 
orders. Especially their intra-alliance bridgebuilding 4  function is important in this 
regard that in the past helped to balance the interests of the major powers. While we 
would not be able to do justice to studying all possible middle powers in the transatlantic 
relationship, our analysis zooms in on one particular middle power, namely Canada as a 
case study, to analyze what function Ottawa could have in the emerging new 
transatlantic order that is heavily influenced and shaped by Trump and Brexit. Such 
analysis, we argue, might give Canada and middle powers in general a new reason d’être 
in international politics at difficult times of transatlantic change.  
Since the term ‘bridgebuilding’ is closely associated with the image of Canada as a 
middle power, we first briefly explain and discuss that concept. What follows is a 
succinct discussion of four variants of this liberal internationalism, one of which is 
bridgebuilding. In the last section we extrapolate from our case study to generalize what 
functions middle powers could possibly play in the changing world order of today.  
  
                                                        
2 s.f. (Lind & Wohlforth, 2019). For a perspective of the endurance of the ‘liberal world’ and that it must be saved see 
(Deudney & Ikenberry, 2018). 
3 Some commentators even include China in this emerging new world order.  
4 In the literature, the terms ‘bridgebuilder’ and ‘linchpin’ have been used interchangeably. Winston Churchill, for 





Image of Canada as a Middle Power  
In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the image of Canada as a middle power was 
shaped by scholar-practitioners who served in the Department of External Affairs. While 
being public servants, they felt a desire to engage in academic discourse and publish in 
academic journals (e.g. International Journal) (this point has been emphasized by many 
analysts including Dewitt and Kirton, 1983, p. 4; Hawes, 1984; p. 4; Holmes, 1979, p.14). 
John W. Holmes, Hume Wrong, and A.F.W. Plumptre were three of those practitioner-
scholars who shaped the idea of Canada as a middle power (see Holmes, 1979; Pearson, 
1979; and with respect to creating new international institutions see  Plumptre, 1977; 
Reid, 1977). By examining the Canadian involvement in the two World Wars,5 they had, 
based on their personal experiences and ideas (Dewitt and Kirton, 1983), a sense that 
Canada could make a difference in the post-1945 world order as long as Ottawa’s actions 
were consistent and skilled (Cooper, 1997; Haws, 1984). However, Canadian foreign 
policy scholarship at the time was non-theoretical and there was no accepted definition 
of the term middle power. Indeed, various authors offered different definitions based on 
geographical, functional or behavioural principles.  
The scholarly literature also appears to be undecided as to when the term middle power 
was first associated with Canada. Adam Chapnick argues that its origins can be traced 
back to the Mackenzie-King government in the 1940s when Canada was striving for 
representation in the UN Security Council (Chapnick, 2012, 3). When Minister of 
External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, delivered the Gray Lecture in Toronto on 13 January 
1947 he outlined five principles of Canadian foreign policy: (1) ensuring national unity; 
(2) promotion of political liberty; (3) respect and promotion for the rule of law in 
international affairs; (4) promotion of Christian values; and (5) active involvement in 
international affairs through participation in multilateral organizations (St. Laurent, 
1947, cited in MacKay, 1971, pp. 390-93). From this account we can already derive the 
first important characteristic of Canada as a middle power, namely that it is above all 
about Canadian interests and maintaining order at home. Internationally, St. Laurent 
signaled to Canada’s allies that Ottawa would not fall back into isolation and remain 
committed and engaged in world politics after the War. 6  Indeed, many Canadian 
officials at the time perceived Canada as a major international player with unique 
functions and capabilities, which was a view that was shared by some of Canada’s closest 
allies (e.g. the UK, the US).  
The second characteristic emerging from St. Laurent’s speech was a clear recognition 
that international affairs after WWII was depicted by power politics. The Mackenzie 
King government realized that even though Canada was one of the victors of the war, it 
did not hold enough weight internationally to be considered a great power. At the same 
time, Ottawa’s self-perception was that it was not a small power either. Against this 
backdrop, it lobbied the international community to award Canada a special status on 
the UN Security Council during the negotiations for creating the UN (For a very 
                                                        
5 On Sept. 10, 1939, a special session of Parliament approved Prime Minister Mackenzie King's request that Canada 
join the war in Europe. The decision came exactly one week after Great Britain and France declared war on Nazi 
Germany. It was the first time that Canadians made their own declaration of war as a sovereign nation. However, 
Canadians fought in World War II as part of British units. The tactical control of Canadian troops on the battlefields of 
Europe remained with Great Britain. However, Canadians selected their own senior officers leading the troops into the 
battle.  
6 There were signs that isolation was a possibility. During the war Prime Minister Mackenzie-King urged for a 
collective security system to prevent another war. However, soon after the fighting had stopped, he began to retreat to 
his pre-war isolationism.  
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comprehensive analysis of Canada’s role in the set-up of the UN (see Chapnick, 2012). 
Specifically, Ottawa had envisioned a model in which great powers would hold a 
permanent seat and a veto power whereas middle powers, like Canada, Australia and 
others, would receive preferential treatment in the selection of non-permanent 
members. As Chapnick (2012, p. 3) reminds us,  
countries such as Canada, are not important enough to be considered great 
powers, but far too important to be relegated to the category of small powers, 
sought to create a distinct position for themselves in the international community, 
one that would be recognized through special status on the Security Council.  
Even though this special status never materialized, the image of Canada as a middle 
power found acceptance among the Canadian public and set the mindset of the country 
internationally. Inherent in these descriptions was the assumption that the international 
system was hierarchical and one in which “objective capability, asserted position, and 
recognized status” (Chapnick, 2012, p. 22) create three classes of states – great powers,7 
middle powers8 and small powers (see Keohane, 1969 for discussion). 
Internationally, the middle power image was based on a functionalist assumption, 
namely that middle powers would contribute their expertise and resources to solving 
international issues and problems based on their relative abilities and capacities. 
Moreover, middle powers were described of having ambitions to counterbalance the 
more powerful states and trying to prevent them from dominating international 
relations. Lastly, middle powers were often geographically located in between major 
powers. In the case of Canada, for example, after WWII it was located geographically in 
the middle between the US and the Soviet Union.  
Canada learned through its colonial experience with Britain that one way of dealing with 
the more powerful US south of its border was to find a counterweight to it. Europe 
naturally filled that position as did the US earlier to the British Empire.9 Indeed, the 
need to find a counterbalance was one of the primary reasons why Canada joined the 
NATO in 1949. To use John Holmes’s words, “Along with the Commonwealth and the 
United Nations, it >NATO@ would give Canada a multilateral forum in which, by 
combining with other lesser powers, it could make its weight felt and so be relieved >…@ 
of the inhibitions of life on a continent with one gigantic neighbour” (Holmes, 1976, pp. 
127-128). Moreover, NATO permanently entangled the Americans into an alliance and 
thus ensured their international engagement to world affairs and commitment to 
multilateralism, having pursued a rather isolationist foreign policy before WWII. 
However, Canada in many ways was unique among its middle power peers such as 
Australia and some Scandinavian countries. First, Canada was in close geographical 
proximity to the US and shared the North American continent with this superpower. As 
such, Canada was exposed to American great power resources and interests, which in 
turn put the Canada-US relationship at the centre of any government’s foreign and 
economic policy in Ottawa. As Charles Doran (1984) argues, both countries value 
different issues in their foreign policy. The US puts more emphasis on the political-
                                                        
7 The authors counted the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Japan as great powers.  
8 Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, The Netherlands, and 
Yugoslavia were seen as middle powers. 





strategic dimension, whereas Canada was mostly concerned with the good health of the 
bilateral economic relationship. Thus, from an American perspective, the relevance of 
the Canada-US relationship was perceived as part of global politics, whereas “Canada 
tends to look at global politics through the lens of its relations with the United States. In 
consequence, the United States sometimes looks at Canada in smaller than real terms 
and Canada often looks at the United States in larger than real terms” (Doran, 1984, p. 
139).  
Secondly, the conduct of Canadian foreign policy was influenced perhaps more than for 
any other middle power by the nature of its domestic politics. In the late 1940s, the 
provincial premiers were gearing for more influence in Canada’s external relations, 
particularly when it came to foreign economic policies. This was partly the result of the 
British North America Act (BNA Act), which did not assign specific competencies in the 
area of foreign affairs to either the federal or provincial government (Nossal, 1997, p. 
295).10 In 1867, a section on these competencies was not required because at the time 
Canada was a Dominion of the British Empire and thus by definition had no autonomy 
in its foreign policy decision-making. 
Not to forget in this puzzle also is the “Quebec factor” (see Chapter 11 in Nossal, 1997, for 
more elaborate discussion) in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. Unlike any 
other province in the federation, Quebec was concerned about its sovereignty with 
regards to its economic policies, foreign direct investments and the relationship with the 
US. Over the years, Quebec acquired the reserve to maintain independent representation 
at selected international organizations and in foreign capitals, independent of Canada 
(e.g. Quebec had its own embassy in Paris).  
Variants of the middle power image 
After WWII, four major variants of the middle power image emerged, including 
functionalism, middle-powermanship, internationalism and niche diplomacy, unfolded 
(Hawes, p. 3; Kirton, 2007, p. 9).  
Functionalism 
Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong demanded in 1942 that Canada’s involvement in world 
affairs should be based on functional principles—that is the extent of Ottawa’s 
involvement, Canadian interests, and its ability to contribute to the situation in question 
(cited in Granatstein, 1969, p. 3). According to Chapnick (2012, p. 74), Prime Minister 
Mackenzie-King believed that “states with functional interests in international affairs 
were of greater interest than those without” and argued that adequate representation 
should be given to those countries that have the “greatest contribution to make to the 
particular object in question.” (cited in Granatstein, 1993, pp. 24-27). According to 
Kirton (2007, p. 40), this functionalism had three imperatives: first, it focused on 
                                                        
10 Constitutional historians and lawyers have debated the official date of Canadian independence from the British 
Empire for a long time. In 1931, with the passage of the Statute of Westminster in the British Parliament, Canada 
obtained full jurisdiction over the conduct of its foreign affairs. It remained part of the Commonwealth. However, 
Canada took a seat at the table at the League of Nations in 1919 as a sovereign country. Nonetheless, even after 1931 
Canada was not given independence in amending its constitution, which in a sense leaves the impression that Canada 
was only a partly sovereign country. This right, however, was given to Canadians in 1982 when the British Parliament 
passed the Constitution Act, which, among other things, gave Canada the power to amend its Constitution, including 
the Constitution Act, 1867 and all other acts of the British Parliament that had amended it over the years. Then 
Canada became fully independent from Great Britain. 
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Canada’s role in the UN system; second, it created a new class in the international 
hierarchy between super- and small powers; and third, it called for active participation 
of Canada in world politics. As Kirton charges, Canada “claimed a management or 
leadership role where its specialized capabilities and interests allowed.” (2007, p. 40). 
This did not, however, mean that Ottawa sought leadership aspirations in all policy 
fields; only in selected areas where its capabilities were significant. 
Middlepowermanship 
The second variant of the middle power concept was the so-called middlepowermanship, 
which clustered powers according to their activities and actions (Kirton, 2007, p. 75). In 
this sense, Canada’s internationalism was based on norms and values of how to conduct 
international relations. Spreading these norms and values became one of the 
cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy. At the same time, it marked a departure from 
the earlier definition of a middle power, namely from states that contribute to 
international affairs more than small powers but less than great powers to “states that 
mediated, conciliated, participated in international peacekeeping missions, and were 
generally good global citizens” (Chapnick, 2012, p. 3). Canada was portrayed as the 
“helpful fixer” and “mediator” in international institutions (e.g. the UN and NATO), and 
worked hard to convince other powers of the virtues of compromise, negotiation and 
conflict resolution, “to lobby so as to avoid dangerous confrontation and to …reduce 
tension among nations.” (Simpson, 2001, p. 7). Canada’s mediation efforts were mostly 
associated with Lester B. Pearson and his bridge-building efforts and pursuit of greater 
world peace while trying to convince the US to keep nuclear weapons out of the Korean 
War in the early 1950s, his work on the three-man Korean ceasefire commission in 
December 1950, as well as his collaboration with India and Poland on the International 
Supervisory Commission in Indochina, and his mediation role during the 1956 Suez 
Canal crisis (Simpson, 1999, p. 80).11 Cooper et al. (1993, p. 19) argue that middle 
powers could be characterized by “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to 
international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in 
international disputes.” Keating (2002, p. 9) agrees and notes that  
policy makers also enjoyed considerable access to the major power centres in 
London and Washington. Canada’s enhanced status, when combined with the 
country’s historical experiences, encouraged a more enthusiastic response on the 
part of policy makers to proposals for post-war organizations. A more activist 
strategy of international involvement emerged as the favoured policy option in 
Ottawa.12  
Against this backdrop, Dewitt and Kirton (2007, p. 403) define middle powers as 
“helpful-fixers”; Lyon and Tomlin (1979) argue that middle powers were located in the 
middle of the ideological spectrum and their role involved special responsibility for 
functional duties (e.g. peacekeeping).  
  
                                                        
11 However, the literature is unclear about the origins and causes of Pearson’s beliefs. Pearson himself references the 
battle experiences he witnessed during the First World War; See in particular chapter two in Pearson (1972). Other 
analysts argue that Pearson’s visions stem from others such as John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden and others. For more about this debate see From an American perspective see Kissinger (1999, pp. 484-89). 
12 What Keating meant by strategy of international involvement is Canadian multilateralism, that is the “practice of 
multilateral diplomacy and the policies supporting the establishment and maintenance of institutions and associations 





The third variant of the middle power metaphor was internationalism, which used 
Canada’s development assistance as a key instrument to raise the profile of Canada in 
the world. 13 It tried to portray the country as proactive and caring and with great 
interests for reducing the inequalities between the world’s rich and poor. The aftermath 
of WWII is referenced in this regard, with Canada helping the Europeans to rebuild their 
countries by offering loans and donations to restore devastated territories, as well as its 
significant development assistance especially to Africa. Thus, one of the key reference 
points for Canada’s engagement in world affairs was the percentile of Canadian 
development assistance rated against its Gross National Product (GNP).  
Niche diplomacy 
Niche diplomacy is the ‘youngest’ of the four variants characterizing middle powers 
(Cooper, 1995; Cooper and Hayes, 2000; Smith, 1999). It was developed in the early 
1990s in light of the fiscal constraints of the federal government demanding that choices 
be made in Canada’s external relations. This reintroduced the notion of specialization of 
Canadians in selected policy issues and in niches where Ottawa could make a difference 
in a growingly complex world.  
In sum, the middle power concept in Canadian foreign policy was a Canadian-oriented 
image. It rationalized rather than objectively explained Canada’s role and standing in the 
world, leaving the obvious gap of a comprehensive non-Canadian perspective on 
Canada’s role as a middle power in world politics. The point is that the image of Canada 
as a middle power was a very Canadian specific image developed by Canadians for 
Canadians (see also Chaban, 2019, in this Special Issue on the role of images and 
perceptions). 
Secondly, as Adam Chapnick (2012) has shown, the middle power concept was 
developed by quasi-academics, political practitioners and for domestic consumption in 
Canada and to achieve certain political objectives, namely to ensure national unity in 
Canada and to help Canadians to find their role in the world. It thus successfully bridged 
the predominant rift among “imperialists, internationalists, and continentalists” 
(Holmes, 1979, p. 128). 
Canadian bridgebuilding 
As noted, before WWII, Canada’s role in international affairs was portrayed as that of a 
bridge (Fox and Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, 1996, p.32) 
between its two closest partners, namely the US and the UK (Lyon and Tomlin, 1979, p. 
11). One of the first functions of a bridge, as Arthur Lower reminds us, is to be walked 
upon (Lower, 1978; also Lower quoted by Lyon and Tomlin, 1979, p. 12). Canada liked 
being a bridgebuilder for some obvious reasons. First, it did not want to get caught in 
between its two major allies (the US and the UK), especially at a time when Canada was 
still considered a Dominion and thus not independent in its foreign policy from the UK, 
in spite of the fact that the Statute of Westminster of 1931 had given Canada a certain 
degree of political autonomy. Second, Canada used this bridgebuilding policy in order to 
have access to its allies (at the time primarily political and economic), and vice versa for 
                                                        
13 This term is understood here as Canada’s foreign aid. 
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allies to have a channel to talk to one another with Canada perhaps as the mediator. 
Canada’s High Commissioner to London, Norman Robertson explains this policy in 
greater detail: 
Ever since we have been in a position to shape our own policy abroad, we had to 
wrestle with the antinomies created by our position as a North American country 
and as a member of the Commonwealth, by our special relationship with the United 
Kingdom and at the same time, although in less degree with other countries in western 
Europe as well. A situation in which our special relationship with the United Kingdom 
can be identified with our special relationship with other countries in western Europe and 
in which the United States will be providing a firm basis, both economically and probably 
militarily, for this link across the North Atlantic, seems to me such a providential solution 
for so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great length and even incur 
considerable risks in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place 
in this new partnership (Robertson, 1948, quoted in Reid, 1977, p. 132) 
Going back in history trying to find examples for this policy, Canadian diplomats were 
credited with helping to prevent a transatlantic rift between the UK and the US during 
the Washington naval negotiations in 1921.14 This was an international conference called 
for by the US to limit the naval arms race and to work out security agreements in the 
Pacific area. Held in Washington, D.C., the conference resulted in the signing of several 
agreements. The relevance of this event is that Canada was asked by the US to put 
pressure on the UK to abandon their Japanese alliance in form of a naval treaty.  
On another occasion, during WWII, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie was asked by 
US President Roosevelt to deliver a secret memo to London at a time when the US was 
not yet engaged in the war (Lyon and Tomlin, 1979, p. 11-12). In other words, Canada 
took up the role of a transatlantic bridgebuilder between the two English-speaking 
countries. This was a rather unique instance at the time, considering that Canada was 
still a Dominion of the British Empire. 
In the literature, the notion of ‘bridge-building’ is used interchangeably with being the 
‘linchpin’. Erika Simpson, for example, notes that the international community 
perceived Canada as a “secondary power serving as a bridge or linchpin between Britain 
and the United States” (Simpson, 1999, p. 7).15 On the political level, British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill is quoted to first having described Canada as the linchpin 
between Britain and the US (Simson, 1999, p. 11). Either way, over the years the 
international community accepted Canada’s new role as an “indispensable element in 
the worldwide quest for peace” (Haglund and Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 
2000, p. 33). The linchpin metaphor, as David Haglund argues, was the description of an 
idealistic worldview based on moral values and ideas (Haglund and Canadian Institute 
of International Affairs, 2000, p. 34). It was associated with the idea that Canada would 
be able to maintain peace and solidarity within the North Atlantic triangle. 16  US 
President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill indirectly acknowledged this 
new role and invited Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King to take part in some of 
                                                        
14 This conference became formally known as the International Conference in Naval Limitations (1921-22). For 
Canadian role playing at the conference see for example  Brebner (1935); Roskill (1979). 
15 For a greater discussion of the bridge-building and linchpin metaphor see Brebner, 1970; Haglund, 2004/2005; 
Haglund and Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 2000. 
16 For a detailed examination of the North Atlantic triangle see for example  Brebner, 1970; Haglund, 2004/2005; 




their war deliberations, which at the time was unheard of for middle powers (Lyon and 
Tomlin, 1979, p. 11).17  
Others, such as historians Brian McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen, argue that the 
metaphor of Canada as the linchpin was first used in the aftermath of the Imperial 
Conference in 1926 (McKercher and Aronsen, 1996, pp. 4-5). The conference was an 
important event in Canadian foreign policy because it accepted the Balfour declaration, 
which acknowledged that Dominions such as Canada would be treated and ranked 
equally to the UK.  
There are several examples of Canadian bridgebuilding post WWII. To start with, it was 
Canadian diplomats who helped to convince the reluctant and somewhat isolationist US 
to sign onto both the NATO as well as the UN (for a detailed account of this time see 
Reid, 1977; for an account of Canada's specific role see Chapnick, 2012). Canadian 
diplomats also helped to ease the tensed relationship over the Suez Canal crisis in the 
1950s that threatened war between the US and the UK, two of Canada’s closest allies 
(Nossal, 1997, p. 58). Moreover, Ottawa assisted the British government in its transition 
from empire to the Commonwealth (Lyon and Tomlin, 1979, p. 18). In short, Canada’s 
global engagements suggested that Ottawa played the role of a community builder and 
organization maintainer.  
As part of this intra-alliance bridge building, Canada exercised a moderating influence 
on Washington. Its policy makers assumed that it was easier to influence their neighbour 
down south through international institutions, because Canadian officials were familiar 
with the US’s political system and culture, which in turn increased its chances for 
influencing the decision-making process in the US machinery of government (e.g. 
Congress). In addition, Canadians are perceived by the US as their closest friends, a 
privilege that gives unprecedented access to decision makers in Washington and 
provides a level of trust (Keohane, 1969; Stairs, 1974). For example, until this day 
Canadians are among the few countries that the US trusts to put their forces under 
Canadian command (as seen in Afghanistan). 
In sum, the international community quickly realized and respected Canada’s unique 
abilities and occasionally asked Canada to help talking to the US on their behalf when 
relations with the US became difficult. In part, this international confidence that other 
countries had in Canadian diplomacy was a reflection of Canada’s quiet diplomacy style 
that it used as a tool of its foreign policy vis-à-vis the US (Tucker, 1980, pp. 18-22; 85-
86). This policy of quietness espouses Canada-US institutional collaboration to isolate 
North American issues from international ones. This was Canadian functionalism at best 
and allowed experts to solve the more technical issues of the relationship (Zyla, 2008). 
Over time, Canadian policy officials came to see the world through the prism of US 
foreign policy (Doran, 1984, p. 139) – that is international issues were defined by looking 
at their importance to the US.18  
  
                                                        
17 Even though it is not historically proven yet if the British Prime Minister and his American counterpart were really 
committed to let Mackenzie King take part of the deliberations as an ally. Thus, it is more likely that they invited the 
Canadian Prime Minister as a gesture of politeness and encouragement for Canada’s behaviour in international affairs.  
18 There is large agreement in the literature that Canada’s role perception is not static; it changes over time. Monton 
(1974), for example has researched Canada’s role perceptions between 1957-72 extensively. His work is based on 
earlier works of Holsti (1970) in the US.  
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Bridgebuilding redux in the period of Trump and Brexit 
Against this historical excursion of Canadian bridgebuilding policy that is deeply 
embedded in its role as a middle power, we can infer what role Ottawa might play in the 
age of Trump in the US and Brexit in the UK and whose governments are both highly 
divisive and openly disrespecting values of multilateralism and the rules based 
international order. To ignore both countries (the US and the UK) is not really an option 
for Canada (and the EU for that matter) moving forward. The reality is that the US will 
always be a vital partner in North America, economically, politically and militarily. Due 
to space constraints, the Brexit must suffice here as an example. 
The Brexit poses a critical moment for the alliance to re-adjust its inter-institutional 
relationship with the EU, as well as what has been appreciated in the literature as the 
‘transatlantic link’ that has bound Europe with its two north American partners (the US 
and Canada) together since the end of WWII. 19  Against this backdrop, we can 
hypothesize that the Brexit will undoubtedly have significant policy implications for all 
transatlantic security actors and institutions involved in the management thereof, in 
Britain, in NATO, and in the EU (see Hofmann, 2018). 
Above all, with the Brexit looming, the Americans are losing their ‘preferred’ ally in the 
EU and one that in the past has helped them to understand the EU. Historically, the 
British held a special relationship with the US (Oliver, 2016; Cyr, 2018). This special 
relationship dates back to Victorian times and has truly solidified itself with the US’s 
entry into WWI (Campbell, 2007). It is thus important to note that the discussion of 
Britain’s relationship with NATO, certainly in its early days, has to a large extent been 
driven by that special relationship between the British and the Americans (Ackerman, 
2016; Ryan, 2016). With the UK leaving the EU, we are likely to see that the UK will 
revert to NATO as its essential source of international legitimacy and influence over 
European security affairs and policy and step up its commitment in the alliance for 
precisely that reason, especially in terms of increasing their postings of additional 
military and political officials that would support NATO’s military and civilian missions. 
This is a logical consequence of a report published by the British House of Commons 
warning that the Brexit will lead to a significantly reduced British influence in the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
2016). Given that the UK currently is one of seven NATO countries20 that meets the 2 
per cent defence spending as a share of national GDP target, we are also likely to see the 
UK joining the US that call upon Europeans to significantly increase their defence 
spending. It would also be difficult to dispute the position as NATO Deputy Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), which traditionally is reserved for the UK 
(Chalmers, 2017, p. 2). Meanwhile, the benefit for the alliance undoubtedly is that it will 
be a strengthened pillar of Euro-Atlantic security as well as a rules-based international 
order. 
Moreover, since the creation of the EU with the Coal and Steel Community in 1952 that 
helped to economically integrate and coordinate the large number of funds from the US 
Marshall Plan, the British were the US’s political ear in the EU, and it is thus no surprise 
that Britain’s politics vis-à-vis the EU largely resemble the US views, especially in the 
                                                        
19 Some analysts have suggested that the Brexit would make it incredibly difficult for the U.K. to continue to cooperate 
with the EU in the areas of foreign-, security- and defence policy. See Bond (2015); Kerr (2016).  





domains of security and the economy. With the UK leaving the EU in early 2020,21 the 
US’ preferred ally in the EU will be gone, with significant political consequences. Above 
all, the US will be losing a partner that has always pushed against deeper EU integration, 
which has been a long-term goal of the Americans. On the other side of that coin is the 
US losing a close diplomatic ally that could convey and amplify its views among EU 
member states. This is particularly important in times of crisis when channels of 
communication are vital. As a result, it is likely that NATO will be strengthened in this 
regard and pay more attention to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty enhancing political 
cooperation in the alliance.  
While Canada historically has enjoyed political, cultural, economic as well as security 
ties with the EU (especially Britain and France), its diplomats could easily help the UK to 
transition its focus from the EU to NATO, which in part clearly is in Canada’s interest as 
a non-member of the EU. Ottawa can have no interest in the UK turning to an 
isolationist foreign policy (see Biscop, 2018) as a result of the Brexit, as it might indeed 
contribute to forming what former Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, has called a two-
tier alliance—that is an alliance of states that share collective burdens and are engaged in 
the alliance and those states that do not.22 Thus, it is close to being certain that what 
NATO needs after the Brexit is a new political commitment among the allies to re-
vitalize Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, namely to “[…] consult together whenever, in 
the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of 
any of the Parties is threatened.“ This will foster the political relationships among NATO 
allies, as well as underline the multidimensionality of transatlantic security and defence 
cooperation. This is where Canadian bridgebuilding and middle powermanship can 
make a significant difference—that is to rekindle the political nature of the alliance, 
which has been Canada’s interest in the alliance since its creation in 1949 (Zyla, 2015). 
Indeed, re-committing to Article 4 will most likely improve NATO’s resilience against 
external shocks and insecurities. In brief, a new political commitment to NATO and its 
allies is desperately needed to assure NATO members, especially those in central and 
south-eastern Europe, that the organization is robust and healthy. These countries need 
to be reassured that there is no need to leave the alliance, or that in case the Brexit 
materializes, they are going to be forced to decide whether they side with the UK to keep 
NATO as the foremost institution governing European security affairs, or with France 
and Germany who continue to push for a more integrated EU defence policy (Zyla and 
Kammel, 2018). 
If Canada could play a significant political role in helping the UK to transition its 
security interests (or at least parts of it) from the EU to NATO, this would allow the 
alliance to focus on its most pertinent security threats at the moment. These include a 
resurging and nationalist Russian foreign policy that is openly threatening NATO’s most 
eastern member states (and Canada’s north for that matter). In short, the most serious 
threat facing both NATO and Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) over 
the short term clearly is Russia, along with the instability permeating the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region as well as threats to its internal cohesion from the rise 
of nationalism and political extremism in several EU member states (e.g. in France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland) (MacGillivray, 2016). Moreover, the UK leaving 
CFSP and its security architecture is exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the 
future of NATO that primarily stems from the US, Turkey, and recently France. French 
                                                        
21 At the time of writing this was the date that Prime Minister Johnson had requested in his letter to the EU asking for 
an extension on the Brexit negotiations in the UK House of Commons. 
22 For evidence that Canada is indeed a net contributor to the alliance and not a free-rider see Zyla (2015, 2019).  
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President Macron has called into question the reliability of the alliance and America’s 
their commitments to it (Trump, 2016). The problem with Turkey is aggravated by its 
problematic civil-military relations, offensive invasion in northern Syria, as well as its 
political proximity with Russia. Turkey has recently bought Russia's S-400 missile 
defense system at a cost of circa $2 billion. The problem with the system is that it was 
designed to down NATO warplanes. A further rapprochement with Russia could also 
complicate decision-making processes within NATO and risk the procurement of the F-
35 fighter jets. All this calls into question Turkey’s reliability as the second largest NATO 
military. As a result, the alliance must be strengthened as a political alliance where allies 
increase their efforts in diplomacy rather than diplomatic spats. 
Canada could also augment its political role in the alliance by building a political ‘bridge’ 
between the UK/EU and the US on the one hand, and between the US and the EU on the 
other hand. As it was the case in the past, this bridgebuilding function continues to be in 
Canada’s interest today. First, Ottawa has no interest of both the EU and the US getting 
in conflict with one another. And second, a healthy relationship would help to strengthen 
Canada’s economic ties, and thus allow continued access and diversification of its trade 
relations while reducing its economic dependency on the US. This is Canadian 
functionalism par excellence. For this to happen, Ottawa must not be afraid to be bold, 
make better use of its foreign service and the career diplomats, and develop healthier 
relations with subject experts in academia and the think tank community.  
On the other side of the bridgebuilding coin is the view from Europe. It is no secret in 
Brussels that most of the EU member states disapprove of the US’ unilateralism and its 
disregard for international institutions (with few exceptions). Canada, with its unique 
geographic and political position, could help to keep the communication channels open 
so that the Europeans (indirectly) could continue to talk and convey their messages to 
the US via Canada (and vice-versa). This would help maintaining political relations 
across the Atlantic and keep each other engaged. This is precisely what a bridge intends 
to do – to connect different shores. 
Conclusion 
Historically, Canada’s foreign relations were complicated because of its status of a 
dominion in the British Empire that limited Ottawa’s autonomy in this area. Between 
1867 and the early 1930s, any decision with regards to Canada’s external relations was 
made by Westminster. It was not until 1931 that Canada gained some autonomy in its 
foreign policy. This was demonstrated in September 1939 when Canada declared war on 
Germany one week after the British did. After 1945, Canadians were searching for their 
role and identity in a post WWII environment and were striving to get recognition for 
their actions. After all, Canada came out of WWII with the third largest navy and as the 
fourth largest air force. The accepted wisdom at the time was that the two great powers – 
the Soviet Union and the US – would dominate the countries in their spheres of 
influence, particularly small powers with weaker power resources and influence to carry 
out policies on their own. 
Canadians’ participation in the two World Wars as a part of the British Empire shaped 
Canadian identity and reputation. The struggle for recognition in international affairs 
was coupled with Ottawa’s push for greater independence from the UK and recognition 
from others in order to locate itself in a superpower world. Above all, the image of 




officials in Ottawa to help Canadians to understand their country’s relative power 
capabilities, and how it could contribute to international politics. This was Canadian 
functionalism par excellence. 
This functionalism is a skill that might be made use of at difficult times of Trump and 
Brexit that helped to create the current transatlantic crisis. If applied successfully, it 
would help both, Canada as well as its allies in the EU and NATO re-establishing the 
primacy of politics in the transatlantic relationship that would allow allies to ‘talk things 
over’ in a dialogue, find diplomatic solutions to difficult policy problems and thus help 
overcome current institutional fragmentations on both sides of the Atlantic. This would 
build a bridge that is much needed these days to help rejuvenate an aging Strategic 
Partnership with the EU, especially in light of US’s indecisiveness thereof. 
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